Introduction
Management quality has direct implications for corporate risk-taking and the decision making process (Li and Tang 2010; Sanders and Hambrick 2007) . We believe that stock markets continually reflect the assessment of management quality including CEOs' demographic characteristics into stock prices. For instance, skilled and qualified CEOs may substantially reduce the uncertainty about management quality and this has implications for stock prices (Pan et al. 2013 ).
The existing body of the literature largely investigates the impact of CEOs' characteristics on corporate governance, R&D spending, acquisition and divestitures, the launch of innovative products, cash holdings and financial performance; see for example Hoskisson et al (1993) ; Sanders (2001) ; Barker and Mueller (2002) ; Greve (2003) ; Nelson (2005) ; Brookman and Thistle (2009); and Orens and Reheul (2013) . In China, the literature mainly investigates the impact of CEO hubris on corporate takeover decisions (Li and Tang, 2010) . We argue that CEOs' demographic characteristics are the main determinant of their hubris and overconfidence and this has implications for corporate risk-taking. Therefore, in this paper, we focus on CEOs' demographic characteristics and their impact on corporate risk-taking in China.
China has an increasing influence on the world economy although it has different socioeconomic and cultural frameworks compared with western countries. Despite the global financial crisis, the Chinese economy has grown at a steady rate over the past few years; 9. 3%, 7.8% and 7.7% in 2011, 2012, and 2013 Therefore, it is interesting to understand the main characteristics of IPOs' boards and the demographic characteristics of their CEOs in particular. We agree with Boone et al (2007) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) that there are several advantages of studying IPOs' board characteristics. Firstly, the vast majority of the literature investigates well established companies and limited research has been carried out using IPOs. Secondly, the evolution of corporate boards can be monitored over time since the IPO year. Thirdly and most importantly, studying board characteristics around the time of the public offering is a particularly rich setting as usually IPOs are subject to significant changes with respect to the governance mechanisms (Baker and Gompers, 2003) . Finally, IPOs are expected to adopt more value-maximising governance features compared with already listed companies (Gertner and Kaplan, 1996) . Therefore, we believe that studying CEO demographic characteristics of the Chinese IPOs and their influence on corporate risk-taking is timely and may offer new insights to the literature in this area.
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the influence of the CEOs' demographic characteristics (e,g, age, board experience, professional experience, education, and gender) on corporate risk-taking. Using a sample of 892 IPOs floated in both the SSE and SZSE during 1999-2012, we find a negative and significant relationship between both CEO age and tenure and corporate risk-taking. However,we find a positive and significant relationship between both CEO higher education and their previous board experience and corporate risk-taking.
Interestingly, and consistent with the findings of Berger et al (2012) , and Adams and Funk (2012), we find that female CEOs are not risk averse.
Our paper has several incremental contributions; firstly, in addition to the influence of CEO gender, we investigate the broader concept of diversity including age, board experience, professional experience and education. Secondly, our paper is-to the best to our knowledgethe first to investigate the influence of CEOs' demographic characteristics and corporate risktaking in China. Moreover, our study contributes to the IPO literature as it is the first to investigate the influence of CEO demographics on risk-taking for IPOs. Our study may provide useful insights to shareholders as they generally seek to hire the most talented CEOs with the relevant set of skills to achieve shareholders' objectives and improve Chinese competitiveness in the global market. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
The next section discusses the literature review and hypotheses development. Sections 3 and 4 present a description of our dataset and the empirical modelling respectively. Section 5 presents the results of our empirical analysis and finally, section 6 summarises and concludes.
Literature review and hypotheses development

Theoretical perspectives
There are a number of theoretical perspectives with respect to CEO characteristics including upper echelons theory, resource dependence theory and human capital theory. The upper echelons theory states that "organizational outcomes-strategic choices and performance levels-are partially predicted by managerial background characteristics" (Hambrick and Mason 1984) . Directors' experience, values and characteristics have an influence on their perceptions and hence their decisions; this is the main premise of the upper echelons theory (Hambrick, 2007) .
Drawing on the upper echelons theory, we argue that CEOs, amongst other decision makers are characterized by bounded rationality. This means that CEOs make decisions based on their social, behavioural and psychological characteristics (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Orens and Reheul 2013) . The latter argue that CEOs' demographic characteristics e.g. education,
age, tenure and professional experience might be used as a proxy for their psychological characteristics. The upper echelons theory also assumes that CEOs' discretion is largely influenced by cognitive, psychological and social factors. A number of studies have drawn on the upper echelons theory to explain the CEOs' demographic characteristics in relation to cash holdings behaviour (Orens and Reheul 2013) ; corporate takeover decisions (Li and Tang 2010) ; innovation (Kitchell 1997); R&D spending (Barker and Mueller 2002) ; and financial disclosure (Bamber et al, 2010) .
On the other hand, the resource dependence theory provides the basis and the theoretical argument with respect to board diversity. Board directors link their companies with external organisations and this help improve companies legitimacy and facilitate their access to resources e.g. information, expertise, communication (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978 and Carter et al, 2010) . Therefore, different types of directors may bring to their companies different resources, hence more diverse boards are likely to bring to their companies different sets of intangible resources (Hillman et al., 2000) . We argue that different CEO characteristics including gender and education bring to the board different perspectives, experience and backgrounds; therefore, the presence of women directors on the board, for instance, brings different benefits and resources to the company (Carter et al, 2010) . Terjesen et al (2009) , using the human capital theory of Becker (1964) , argue that individual's education, skills and experience frame their cognition and productivity and hence benefit the overall company. Therefore, according to the human capital theory, different types of directors or different human capital may bring different backgrounds and different experiences to the board (Hillman et al, 2000) . We argue that more diverse boards may have better ability and better management quality which help the company to address different environmental dependencies. Moreover, Mateos de Cabo et al, (2012) state that female directors bring forward new opinions and perspectives that would not otherwise be demonstrated if the boards were homogeneous. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) , drawing on agency theory, argue that to better exercise the monitoring role, boards should include an appropriate mix of experience and backgrounds in order to effectively evaluate management and assess business strategies.
CEO demographic characteristics
There has been an ongoing debate in the literature regarding the influence of CEO characteristics on corporate risk-taking proxies. Lin et al (2011) Using psychometric tests Graham et al (2013) investigate the differences in CEO risk aversion and optimism and find that US CEOs differ significantly from non-US CEOs in terms of their underlying attitudes. They also find that the more the risk-tolerance of CEOs the more mergers and acquisitions initiated by their companies. Moreover, they find that more optimistic CEOs rely particularly on short-term debt. Nicolosi (2013) finds that higher dividend yields are associated with married, Republican, Christian CEOs. Kaplan et al (2012) find that CEOs' general ability e.g. interpersonal-related skills are the key determinants for subsequent success in a buyout. Malmendier et al (2011) find that CEOs with military experience follow a more aggressive strategy and prefer high leverage. Moreover, CEOs who grew up during the Great Depression period are more risk averse as they rely more on internal sources of finance.
CEO age
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) claim that older CEOs adopt less aggressive investment strategies and rely on traditional management styles. Orens and Reheul (2013) argue that, according to the upper echelons theory, older CEOs are more risk averse and conservative than younger CEOs. Therefore they are more likely to undertake corporate decisions which are not aligned with the interests of shareholders. Furthermore, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) claim that older CEOs may have greater influence over the board. Therefore, their experience and knowledge may allow them to exert power over the board of directors and accordingly to take less risky decisions. Hence older CEOs may be seen as more conservative (Hambrick and Mason 1984) and risk-averse (MacCrimmon and Wehrung 1986) as they follow defensive rather than offensive strategies (Child 1974).
Equally, Graham et al (2013) find that younger CEOs are risk-tolerant and usually run fast growth companies. Beber and Fabbri (2012) argue that younger CEOs may focus on short term objectives in the hope of building their reputation. Therefore, they may take more risk compared with older CEOs. Barker and Mueller (2002) find that the younger the CEOs the greater the R&D spending. Yim (2013) finds that there is a negative link between CEO age and corporate acquisitions. Moreover, he finds no impact of CEO age on company's growth and capital expenditures. The above discussion suggests that older CEOs may prefer not to make risky decisions compared with younger CEOs who may be more inclined to make riskier decisions. Therefore older CEOs are more likely to undertake corporate decisions which are not aligned with the interests of shareholders and hence, we hypothesise the following:
H1: There is a negative relationship between CEO age and corporate risk-taking.
CEO board experience
Chen and Zheng (2014) argue that longer-tenured CEOs may imply greater managerial power and entrenchment. An entrenched CEO may enjoy other benefits e.g. more control; therefore they might be less motivated to make risky decisions (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; John et al., 2008; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Chen and Zheng, 2014) . Grimm and Smith (1991) find a negative relationship between CEO tenure and changes in the company's strategy. This suggests that CEOs with a longer tenure might be seen as more committed to their plans and their views on how the company should be run (Hambrick and Fukutomi 1991) . Moreover, the longer the CEO tenure the less likelihood of implementing changes as their job novelty may decrease and hence they may not have the required responses and reactions to changes in the external environment (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991 and Miller, 1991) . Orens and Reheul (2013) argue that newly appointed CEOs are more likely to consider risky alternatives as they are externally focused and much more receptive to new business ideas compared with longer tenured CEOs. However, longer tenured CEOs have the ability-through their personal relationships -to influence directors' selection compared with shorter-tenured CEOs (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996) . Moreover, stakeholders believe that longer-tenured CEOs add to the company legitimacy (Orens and Reheul 2013) .
On the other hand, Anderson et al (2011) argue that directors' decision making is influenced by the time spent serving as both a director on their company's board of directors and also as a director on other boards. They also argue that CEOs' previous board experience enables them to better understand corporate culture and group dynamics. Koellinger (2008) 
CEO professional experience
Professional experience provides CEOs with a clearer vision and knowledge of the external environment of the company including its customers and suppliers, in addition to corporate regulations (Anderson et al., 2011) . This enables CEOs to evaluate potential investment opportunities through the trade-off between risk and return (Orens and Reheul 2013) .
Professionally experienced CEOs are also more likely to have a better perception of company problems and this may enhance the communication and co-ordination in the company, thus facilitating better decision making. Herrmann and Datta (2006) argue that professional experience is one of the main determinants of CEOs' ability to make strategic decisions. 
CEO education
Anderson et al (2011) argue that different educational backgrounds (level of education e.g. postgraduate studies) may bring into the board different viewpoints, perspectives, cognitive paradigms, and different professional development. The literature on CEO education finds inconclusive results. Thomas et al (1991) and Barker and Mueller (2002) argue that highly educated CEOs are likely to lead more innovative companies. Orens and Reheul (2013) 
CEO gender
The resource dependence theory assumes that female directors bring to the board different perspectives and experience. The existing body of the literature documents that female directors are more risk averse. Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) and Sunden and Surette (1998) argue that the perception that women are less risk averse than men may explain the low proportion of females sitting on banks' boards. Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn (2011) find that companies with more gender diverse boards were less involved in sub-prime lending.
Mateos et al (2012) argue that this stereotype of risk averse female directors is the main reason for the "Glass Ceiling" on the corporate promotion ladder. Graham et al (2013) find that female CEOs are less likely to have higher leverage ratios compared with their male counterparts. Similarly, Huang and Kisgen (2013) find that female CEOs are less likely to rely on long-term debt and to undertake acquisitions. They also find that female CEOs are likely to exercise stock options early compared with male CEOs and this suggests that male
CEOs are more overconfident with respect to corporate decisions.
On the other hand, Berger et al (2012) find that a higher proportion of female board members is associated with an increase in risk-taking. Adams and Funk (2012) find that female directors are more benevolent and universally concerned but less power-oriented than their male counterparts. More importantly, they find that female directors are more risk-loving than male directors. Thus, having a woman on the board may not lead to more risk-averse decision-making (Adams and Funk 2012). The above discussion shows that there is a large strand in the existing literature which supports the negative association between the presence of female directors (including CEOs) and corporate risk-taking. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, there are no other studies that investigate the impact of CEO gender on corporate risk-taking in China. Based on the above discussion we formulate our sixth hypothesis:
H6: There is a negative relationship between the presence of female CEOs and corporate
risk-taking.
Data and sample
We collect data on corporate risk-taking, CEO characteristics, corporate governance, and (2013) among others that the general manager is the company's "top executive" who is equivalent to "Chief Executive
Officer" (CEO) in Western countries 3 .
Corporate risk-taking measures
Prior studies have used different proxies for risk-taking including R&D intensity, innovation, days adjusted for dividends, stock dividends, and stock splits. We also calculate company specific risk (unsystematic) for each company-year. Company specific risk (unsystematic) is unique and related to their operating activities. We measure company specific risk as the annualised standard deviation of the daily abnormal returns generated by the market model and market adjusted model (as a robustness check) for each year. We use both SSE and SZSE composite market-value weighted indices as benchmarks for the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges respectively. Finally, we calculate systematic risk as the difference between total risk and company specific risk.
CEO characteristics
We collect data on CEO characteristics namely age, board experience, professional experience, education, and gender. We identify CEO age and gender for each company over the sample period. Board experience takes into account the length of time served on the current board (tenure). We also use previous boards' memberships as another proxy for CEO board experience by specifying a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO has previous board memberships and 0 otherwise. To measure CEO education, we create a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a CEO holds a postgraduate degree (e.g. Masters and/or PhD) and 0 otherwise.
Moreover, we collect data on professional experience and classify the professional backgrounds of CEOs into three main categories 5 namely, Science/Engineering, Economics/Accounting and Law following Anderson et al (2011) . Therefore, we create dummy variables taking the value of 1 if a CEO has a respective background in the relevant professional category and 0 otherwise. Finally, we create a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a CEO has a political background and 0 otherwise.
Corporate governance characteristics
We collect data on governance characteristics of the Chinese IPOs. These include board size, board independence, and ownership structure. Board size is measured by the total number of directors sitting on the board of directors (BoD). We measure board independence by the proportion of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) sitting on the BoD. Hillman et al (2000) find that board structure (measured by size and independence) reduces company uncertainty when directors link the company with its external environment. Moreover, we measure CEO/chair duality as defined by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 where the roles of the CEO and Chairman are conducted by the same person and 0 otherwise. We believe that combining the roles of CEO and Chair might be seen as an indication of power vested in a single individual.
Despite the economic reform and privatisation of many state-owned companies, the state still owns a majority of controlling shareholdings in Chinese listed companies (Sun and Tong 2003) . This may have an impact on CEO discretion and thus corporate risk-taking (Li and Tang 2010) . Therefore, we control for the ownership structure as measured by the proportion of state-owned shares. Chang and Wong (2009) claim that either the central or provincial government in China appoints senior directors including the CEO; whilst Li and Tang (2010) claim that the government also appoints the CEOs of non-state-owned companies to ensure their compliance with government policies (Li and Tang 2010) . On the other hand, Barker and Mueller (2002) and May (1995) argue that the greater the CEO share ownership, the more risky the decisions they undertake. Therefore, we measure CEO share ownership 6 by the proportion of shares owned by the CEO and expect that corporate risk-taking is higher in companies where CEOs have significant share ownership.
Company specific variables
We control for the financial performance of IPOs using both lagged return on assets (ROA) and lagged values of Tobin's Q (market value of equity, the book value of debt and the book value of preferred stocks divided by the book value of total assets). We expect a positive relationship between lagged financial performance and corporate risk-taking. We also construct a number of company-specific variables which are the primary determinants of corporate risk-taking. We use companies' lagged total assets as a proxy for size. We also use lagged total debt to total assets ratio as a proxy for leverage. Moreover, we control for company age defined as the number of years since the IPO. We also control for the lagged ratio of intangible assets to total assets as a proxy for fast growth companies. Finally, we create a set of industry, stock exchange (SSE and SZSE) and year dummies to control for any potential inter-industry, listing exchange and time specific effects.
Empirical Modelling
Endogeneity may bias the estimation results and lead to spurious correlations due to the omitted unobservable company characteristics e.g. corporate culture, norms and management quality which are assumed to be time-invariant during the period of study (Adams and Ferreira 2009). To investigate the impact of CEO demographic characteristics on corporate risk-taking for the Chinese IPOs, we use a fixed effects model to control for company heterogeneity and any other unobservable company characteristics that may influence the results 7 . The advantage of a fixed effects model is that it controls for the potential omitted company characteristics that may lead to inconsistent estimation due to endogeneity issues.
However there is another source of endogeneity, namely reverse causality. In our empirical estimation, there might be a reverse causality between corporate risk-taking and board structure. Moreover, there might be a reverse causality between ownership structure and corporate risk-taking (Low 2009; Bhagat and Bolton 2008; Demsetz and Lehn 1985) .
Therefore as a robustness test and following Low (2009)  are assumed to be independent for each i over all t. We use lagged levels instruments for the regression in differences, and lags of the first-differenced variables for the equation in levels. Therefore, we use 4 lags of board size, board independence, CEO ownership and state ownership as instruments in the equation in first-differences, and 3 lags of their differences as instruments in the equation in levels. For all regression models, we control for time fixed effects and estimate clustered standard errors using the Windmeijer (2005) correction procedures to produce robust standard errors.
We argue that our study is less subject to selection bias due to the CSRC regulation -in particular article 12 in which there should not be significant change in the directors and senior management team of the issuer in the three years prior to an IPO 9 . Therefore, the reverse causality between directors' characteristics and risk taking behavior is unlikely in our paper. Furthermore, Table 2 also shows that, the proportion of CEOs with postgraduate degrees is significantly higher for the SZSE being 36% compared with the SSE at 18%. Moreover, CEOs board experience is greater in the SZSE as the proportions of CEOs with previous board memberships are 33% and 52% for the SSE and the SZSE respectively. Table 2 also shows that there is no significant difference between the proportions of female CEOs in either the SSE (4%) or the SZSE (5%). Finally, CEOs' share ownership is greater in the SZSE (5%) compared with the SSE (0.5%). The results also show that there is a significant difference in corporate risk-taking measures with respect to CEO gender. The average total risk for female and male CEOs is 88% and 69% respectively whereas the average company specific risk for female and male CEOs is 79% and 62% respectively. Moreover, the average systematic risk for female and male CEOs is 0.6% and 0.4% respectively. This suggests that female CEOs are not risk averse compared with their male counterparts in China. Finally, we find that CEOs with previous board memberships are likely to make risky decisions.
Empirical results
Insert Table 2 about here
Insert Table 3 about here   Table 4 presents the correlation matrix for the main variables used in the empirical analysis.
It is clear from Table 4 that there is no evidence of a multicollinearity problem as none of the correlations between the independent variables is significantly above 0.50. Table 5 show that there is a negative and significant (p value <5%) relationship between CEO age and both total risk and company specific risk as in panels A and B
Insert Table 4 about here
respectively. This suggests that older CEOs are more risk averse compared with younger CEOs. Therefore, younger CEOs are likely to make risky decisions. Our result is consistent with the upper echelons theory and the findings of Orens and Reheul (2013) . Therefore, our first hypothesis is supported.
We also find a negative and highly significant relationship (P value <1%) between CEO tenure and both total risk and company specific risk respectively. However, the relationship between CEO tenure and systematic risk is also negative but marginally significant as in Panel C. This suggests that long tenured CEOs are less likely to consider risky decisions as they are internally focused and much less receptive to new business ideas compared with short-tenured CEOs. This result is consistent with Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) and Orens and Reheul (2013) . We argue that longer-tenured CEOs might be more interested in the stability and efficiency of their companies and hence may not make some risky decisions.
The above result supports our second hypothesis.
Insert Table 5 about here
The results also show that there is a positive and highly significant relationship (p value <1%)
between CEO board experience measured by CEO previous board memberships and corporate risk-taking measures. Our result is also consistent with Koellinger (2008) and Orens and Reheul (2013) as board experience provides CEOs with broader perspectives, more openness to encourage innovative and risky ideas and hence they are likely to make risky decisions. Therefore, the above results support our third hypothesis. Interestingly, we find a positive and highly significant (p value <1%) relationship between female CEOs and both total risk and company specific risk. This result is in contrast with the existing body of the literature which documents that female directors are more risk averse (Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998; Sunden and Surette 1998) . However, our result is consistent with the recent studies of Berger et al (2012) and Adams and Funk (2012) . They find that the higher the proportion of female directors the more risk-taking. We argue that this result is consistent with human capital and resource dependence theories as female CEOs may bring to the board different viewpoints, perspectives, and different professional experiences and thus they may prefer to make more risky decisions. Based on the above results, we reject our sixth hypothesis. (2000), we find that larger companies are likely to have less total risk and company specific risk, though more systematic risk. Furthermore, we find a positive and significant relationship between both board size and independence and total risk and company specific risk respectively. Therefore, large and more independent boards are overall likely to make risky decisions. Moreover, when directors link the company with its external environment, board size and independence may reduce company uncertainty (Hillman et al., 2000) . Finally, the fixed effects models are well-specified as F-statistics are highly significant. Sun and Tong (2003) claim that the Chinese government still owns a majority of controlling shareholdings in listed companies, despite the economic reform and privatisation programme adopted by the state. This may have an impact on CEO discretion and thus corporate risktaking (Li and Tang 2010) . In this section we address the concerns that the influence of CEOs demographics is particularly driven by state ownership. Therefore, we present the fixed effects regressions for both state-owned and non-state-owned IPOs as in Table 6 .
Insert Table 6 about here
We find consistent results with those presented in Table 5 with respect to the influence of CEO tenure, previous board experience, and professional experience in addition to CEO ownership on corporate risk-taking for both state-owned and non-state-owned IPOs.
However, we notice that there is a negative and significant influence of CEO age on total risk and company specific risk for non-state-owned IPOs. Moreover, we find similar relationships -to those presented in Table 5 -between both CEO gender and political connections and corporate risk-taking only for state-owned IPOs. With respect to CEO higher education, we find that there is a positive and significant relationship between CEO education and corporate risk-taking only for state-owned IPOs. Interestingly, we find that independent boards for non-state-owned IPOs are likely to make risky decisions; however, we find no impact of board size on total risk and company specific risk for both state-owned and non-state-owned IPOs. To sum up, the results presented in Table 6 show that the determinants of corporate risk-taking behaviour do significantly vary between state-owned and non-state-owned IPOs with respect to the impact of CEO demographic characteristics namely age, gender, and education. Younger CEOs in non-state-owned IPOs are likely to make risky decisions, whereas in state-owned IPOs, CEOs with post-graduate qualifications and female CEOs are less risk averse and likely to take more risk. Moreover, the greater the board independence the more risk-taking in non-state-owned IPOs.
The results presented earlier in Table 2 show that there is a significant difference in CEOs demographics between both the SSE and SZSE. Table 7 presents the results of the fixed effects regressions of the influence of CEOs demographic characteristics on corporate risktaking for IPOs listed in both SSE and SZSE as presented in Panels A and B respectively.
Insert Table 7 about here
Overall we find similar results to those presented in Table 5 . We find a negative relationship between CEO age and corporate risk-taking measured by total risk and company specific risk.
However, this relationship is significant only in the SZSE. We also find a negative and significant link between CEOs tenure and both total risk and company specific risk.
Moreover, we find a positive relationship between CEO previous board experience and corporate risk-taking; however, this relationship is more significant in the SSE.
On the other hand, we find a significant and negative relationship between CEOs with Science/Engineering and Accounting/ Economics backgrounds and both total risk and company specific risk in the SSE. Furthermore, we find a significant and positive link between CEOs higher education and both total risk and company specific risk in the SZSE.
Consistent with the results presented in Table 5 , CEO share ownership has no influence on corporate risk-taking in both the SSE and the SZSE. However, we find a positive and significant relationship between state-ownership and corporate risk-taking in both the SSE and the SZSE. Finally, the results show that female CEOs are not risk averse and are likely to make risky decisions in the SZSE.
In this section, we present the results of a number of robustness tests. CEO turnover may have an impact on corporate risk-taking, therefore, we control for CEO turnover to address the concern of selection bias 10 and re-estimate the fixed effects models. On the other hand, Roodman (2009) argue that fixed effects models may produce biased results due to their econometrics problems such as serial correlation (our measure of corporate risk-taking measures may suffer from serial correlation). Therefore, we estimate the system GMM as a robustness check. Table 8 presents the results of these robustness tests as in Panels A and B.
Insert Table 8 about here
Overall, the results presented in Panel A are similar to those of Table 5 . However, we find that the coefficient on CEO turnover is statistically insignificant for corporate risk-taking measures. Therefore, there is no influence of CEO turnover on corporate risk -taking for Chinese IPOs. Moreover, the results presented in Panel B are consistent with the fixed effects estimation with regard to the CEO age, tenure, and CEO previous board experience.
However, we find a negative and significant link between CEOs with Law backgrounds and both total risk and company specific risk. This result suggests that CEOs with Law background are less likely to make risky decisions.
The results presented in Panel B also show a negative and highly significant relationship between politically connected CEOs and both total risk and company specific risk. We also find similar results to those presented in Table 5 with respect to the influence of CEO gender and education on corporate risk-taking. Finally, the models are well specified as the Hansen test does not reject the over-identifying restrictions assumption and the results of the Arellano-Bond (1991) test for second order serial correlation is insignificant.
Summary and conclusion
The uncertainty about management quality is always a key issue for shareholders as stock markets continually reflect the assessments of CEOs' characteristics, skills and their risk profiles into stock prices. China has an increasing influence on the world economy although it has different socio-economic and cultural frameworks compared with western countries.
Therefore studying the Chinese experience in relation to the CEOs' demographic characteristics and corporate risk-taking provides some unique insights and adds to the existing literature on corporate governance.
Using a sample of 892 IPOs floated in both the SSE and the SZSE during 1999-2009, the univariate analysis shows that there is a significant difference in total risk and company specific risk between younger and older CEOs and this suggests that younger CEOs are likely to make risky decisions compared with older CEOs. We also find that there is a significant difference in corporate risk-taking between female and male CEOs. This result is consistent with Berger et al (2012) and Adams and Funk (2012) 4 We could not find data on innovation, on CSMAR database and many missing data on R&D expenditure as alternative proxies for corporate risk-taking as not all IPOs invest in R&D. 5 According to the CSMAR database, there are other categories such as Academics. However, we used the classification of CEOs' professional experience following Anderson et al (2011) . 6 Agency theory provides the basis and the rationale for the board's monitoring function on behalf of shareholders and entails that agents (the directors) are working in the best interests of shareholders. According to agency theory, executive share ownership may align long-term objectives of both shareholders and top executives. Therefore, share ownership may encourage CEOs and top executives to adopt wealth-enhancing objectives by making more risky decisions (Jensen 1993) . 7 We also run the Hausman test to decide between fixed or random effects. The test result rejects the null hypothesis that errors are not correlated with regressors. Therefore we conclude that the fixed effects model is preferred against the alternative random effects model. 8 The system GMM allows for the use of lagged variables to control for endogeneity. It also assumes that the idiosyncratic error terms are heteroskedastic and serially correlated, and uncorrelated across companies (Roodman, 2009 10 We also excluded the observations where the company appoints a new CEO and re-estimate the fixed effects regressions. We find similar results to those presented in Table 5 . T. Risk: annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns for each company year. Daily stock returns are calculated as the first difference in the natural logarithm of the closing price over two consecutive trading days adjusted for dividends, stock dividends, and stock splits. Unsys. Risk: Unsystematic (firm-specific) risk measured as the annualized standard deviation of the residuals of market model and market adjusted model for each company year. Sys. Risk: Systematic risk measured by the difference between total risk and firm-specific risk. We use both SSE and SZSE composite market-value weighted indices as benchmarks for the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges respectively. CEOAge: CEO age measured by years; CEO Tenure: the length of time served on the current board; CEO Exp: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO has previous board memberships and 0 otherwise; CEO Prof. Ex: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO has a background in Science/Engineering, Accounting/Economics and Law respectively and 0 otherwise. PolconCEO: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise; CEO edu: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO holds a postgraduate degree (e.g. Masters and/or PhD) and 0 otherwise; Fem CEO: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO is female and 0 otherwise; CEO/Chair: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO and the Chair are the same person and 0 otherwise; CEOOwn: percentage of shares owned by CEOs; StateOwn: percentage of State share ownership; ROA: return on assets calculated as (net profits + financial expenses)/average total assets; Tobin's Q: Q ratio measured by (market value of equity, the book value of debt and the book value of preferred stocks divided by the book value of total assets); Bsize: board of directors' size; INED: percentage of independent non-executive directors ; lnTA: natural logarithm of company's total assets as a proxy for company size; Coage: company age since its establishment year; Debt/TA: total debt to total assets ratio as a proxy for leverage; IA ratio: Intangible assets intensity ratio measured by the proportion of intangible assets to total assets; Exchange: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if an IPO is floated in Shanghai Stock Exchange and 0 for Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
